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ACCEPTANCE AND DISHONOR: "PAYABLE
THROUGH" DRAFTS AND PERSONAL
MONEY ORDERS
Arthur G. Murphey, Jr. *
I. INTRODUCTION
A basic rule concerning a negotiable instrument is that no per-
son is liable on such an instrument "unless his signature appears
thereon."' The Uniform Commercial Code does not define "signa-
ture" in a way to distinguish it from "name." Logically, a signature
must be signed, but the Code in defining "signed" provides only that
it "includes any symbol executed ... with present intention to au-
thenticate a writing."'2 From that definition, however, there is at
least a reasonable implication that a person's name must be put on
an instrument with an "intention to authenticate it" if the effect is to
cause the person to be liable on the instrument.3
On an ordinary draft or check, the signature of the drawee does
not appear. Thus, the drawee is not liable on the instrument to the
holder.4 Since no Code provision otherwise requires that he pay the
holder, he incurs no liability to the holder if he refuses to pay the
instrument. If the drawee does put his signature on the draft, this
act is known as "acceptance" and the drawee then becomes liable on
the draft.- Unfortunately since the word "acceptance" has other
and better-known meanings, it is easily used incorrectly. The ac-
ceptance of a check is a "certification,"6 a word less likely to be used
incorrectly.
Two recent Arkansas cases, one decided by the Supreme Court
and the other by the Court of Appeals, dealt with the acceptance of
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law. The author
acknowledges the helpful criticism of Professors D. Fenton Adams and George W. Stengel,
presently on the Faculty and Mr. E. Steve Watson, General Counsel of First Arkansas
Bankstock Corporation.
1. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-401 (1961).
2. Id. § 85-1-201 (39) (Supp. 1981).
3. Menke v. Board of Educ., 211 N.W.2d 601, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 675 (Iowa 1973) (con-
cerning a check bearing a certification stamp but no signature).
4. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-409(1) (1961).
5. Id. § 85-3-410(1).
6. Id. §85-3-411(1).
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instruments by drawees. The cases involved successful claims by
persons who were holders in due course against drawees who had
dishonored the instruments. Both involved issues which were also
decided by courts of other jurisdictions. One case had to decide
whether the instrument was negotiable; the drawee admittedly had
signed it. The other had to decide whether the drawee had accepted
it; it was admittedly negotiable. Also, one case involved a draft, one
of the oldest of the negotiable instruments, while the other involved
a personal money order, an instrument of recent origin. Both cases
had some errors in them which will be discussed here.
The purpose of this article is to explain some practices and
rules concerning certain negotiable instruments, along with special
language used. Then using that explanation as a background, this
article will examine the errors made in the two cases and in other
cases like them.
II. THE CASES
The first case, Canal Insurance Co. v. First National Bank of
Fort Smith,' was decided by the Arkansas Court of Appeals; and
the decision was affirmed by the supreme court. The insurance
company issued a so-called "payable through" draft, drawn on it-
self, and containing the words "Upon acceptance pay. . . ." It was
mistakenly issued to one Jim Marlar, payable to him only. It should
have been payable jointly to him and another. Marlar in turn
quickly deposited it in his bank and withdrew the amount of the
draft. This made the depositary bank a holder in due course. The
insurance company's defense of erroneously issuing the draft was a
"personal" defense, one which could not be used to avoid paying a
holder in due course. The bank, however, would not have been a
holder in due course if the instrument had not been negotiable; and
a draft is not negotiable if its order to pay is conditional. The insur-
ance company contended that "Upon acceptance pay . . ." made
the order conditional and that therefore the instrument was not ne-
gotiable. The court disagreed, finding the promise was uncondi-
tional. It referred to cases which had held that a draft drawn by a
drawee was accepted by being issued (or drawn). The court con-
cluded that the insurance company could not countermand the
draft.
The holding was correct; the promise was unconditional. It is
7. 266 Ark. 1044, 596 S.W.2d 710 (Ark. App. 1979), aff'd 268 Ark. 356, 596 S.W.2d 709
(1980).
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submitted, however, first, that the court misconstrued the meaning
of the word "acceptance" and, second, that when it said that the
drawee "could not" countermand (stop payment on) the draft it did
not properly describe the insurance company's rights in such a situa-
tion. These two points will be discussed more fully.
The second case, Sequoyah State Bank v. Union National
Bank,' was decided by the Arkansas Supreme Court. In Sequoyah
the defendant bank sold a personal money order to a woman for a
check which (unknown to the bank) was drawn on insufficient
funds. The money order was later deposited in the plaintiff bank;
and by allowing a withdrawal, the bank became a holder in due
course. Meanwhile, the purchaser's check was dishonored; thus
when the money order was presented to the defendant bank, pay-
ment was refused. The plaintiff bank brought suit, and the defend-
ant bank contended the personal money order was similar to a
personal check and therefore it could dishonor it without liability to
the holder. The court, however, held it could not. It referred to a
New York trial court case9 in which it was stated that it is "the cus-
tom and practice of the business community to accept personal
money orders as a pledge of the issuing bank's credit."10 The Ar-
kansas court elected to "consider this custom and practice" in regu-
lating the handling of the money order. The court then cited the
same case in holding that issuing "the money order with the bank's
printed name evidences an intent to be bound."" Thus, the bank
owed the same obligation to the holder as on a certified check (or
accepted draft). The court concluded, "Banks are not allowed to
stop payment on their depositor's checks and certainly should not be
allowed to stop payment on personal money orders."'' 2
It is submitted, that in following what was apparently only the
personal opinion of a New York trial court judge to determine cus-
tom in Arkansas, the court departed from its own precedents. The
dissenting opinion pointed out that there "is not one single word in
the transcript or abstract about business custom.' 3 The decision,
therefore, introduces some confusion into the requirements of the
court for proving custom.
8. 274 Ark. 1, 621 S.W.2d 683 (1981).
9. Mirabile v. Udoh, 92 Misc. 2d 168, 399 N.Y.S.2d 869 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1977).
10. 274 Ark. at 3, 621 S.W.2d at 683 (citing Mirabile v. Udoh, 92 Misc. 2d 168, 168, 399
N.Y.S.2d 869, 870-71 (1977)).
11. Id. at 4, 621 S.W.2d at 684.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 7, 621 S.W.2d at 686.
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Furthermore, the theory of liability adds a new rule to Arkan-
sas commercial law that need not be there. To find liability because
the "bank's printed name" "evidences an intent" (to be bound) is to
put emphasis in the wrong place and to use an approach that the
Uniform Commercial Code has rendered obsolete. It adopts a the-
ory of recovery that could cause unnecessary problems.
Finally, the court's statement that drawees are not allowed to
stop payment is as misleading as the similar statement was in the
Canal case. These three points will also be discussed later.
III. THE BACKGROUND
A. Introduction
A generation ago, law students studied a course called "Bills
and Notes." Bills were bills of exchange 4-the term the English
used for drafts. Notes were promissory notes.' 5 All negotiable in-
struments were of one type or the other. Now, the commonly used
negotiable instruments are governed by Article Three of the Uni-
form Commercial Code and are called "Commercial Paper."' 6 A
"maker" expressly promises to pay a "note-type" instrument,' 7 and
if he does not pay on time he can be sued on the instrument. A
drawer, however, expressly orders a drawee to pay a "draft-type"
instrument.'" If the drawee does not pay and, after notification of
nonpayment, the drawer does not pay, the drawer can be sued on
the instrument-not because of an express promise by the drawer on
the instrument but because the law requires him to pay.' 9 Even
14. Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law § 126.
15. Id. § 184.
16. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-101 (1961) provides: Short title.-This Article [chapter]
shall be known and may be cited as Uniform Commercial Code-Commercial Paper; And
Id. § 85-3-104(2) describes four types of instruments.
A writing which complies with the requirements of this section is
(a) a "draft" ("bill of exchange") if it is an order,
(b) a "check" if it is a draft drawn on a bank and payable on demand;
(c) a "certificate of deposit" if it is an acknowledgment by a bank of receipt of
money with an engagement to repay it;
(d) a "note" if it is a promise other than a certificate of deposit.
17. Id. § 85-3-413 provides in pertinent part:
(1) The maker or acceptor engages that he will pay the instrument according to its
tenor at the time of his engagement or as completed pursuant to Section 3-115
[§ 85-3-1151 on incomplete instruments.
The terms "engage" and "engagement" are equivalent to "promise."
18. Id. § 85-3-104(2)(a).
19. Id. § 85-3-413 further provides:
(2) The drawer engages that upon dishonor of the draft and any necessary notice
[Vol. 5:519
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though the drawee refuses on his own to pay the instrument, he can-
not be sued by (that is, he is not liable to) anybody but the
drawer°-and then only when the refusal to pay is wrongfu 2 -
except under certain circumstances which will be explained later.22
The drawee does not, on the instrument, expressly promise to pay;
nor does the law require him to pay a holder, and although the law
and a special contract make him liable to the drawer for wrongful
dishonor, this liability was not involved in the cases analyzed here.
B. Drafts and Checks
One type of draft is the check. It is a draft drawn on a bank
and payable on demand (meaning "immediately"). 23 There are also
drafts not drawn on banks, which may be drawn on persons or cor-
porations. Those payable on demand are usually called "sight"
drafts; a "time draft" is one not payable on demand.
There is a difference in the way in which a check and a draft
may be used to purchase goods. If A, in Little Rock, wishes to buy
$1,000 worth of goods from B, in Fort Smith, A can use a check. A,
the buyer, will be the drawer, his drawee must be a bank, and B
must be able to get his money as quickly as he can get to A's bank
("immediately" or "on demand"). Of course, B willprobably not go
straight to A's bank. He willprobably take it to his own bank and
deposit it. The bank will in turn send it to Little Rock for A's bank
to pay it. This will mean in actuality that B may not get any money
for several days. In some cases B's bank may let him withdraw part
or all of the amount of the check immediately or very soon thereaf-
ter. The Fort Smith bank in the Canal case followed this practice
even though a draft and not a check was involved. Furthermore,
when A writes his check, it is expected that A has $1,000 on deposit
in his bank. Under certain circumstances it is a criminal offense if
he writes the check and the money is not on deposit.2 4
Suppose, however, the parties agree to use a draft. 5 In this
of dishonor or protest he will pay the amount of the draft to the holder or to
any indorser who takes it up. The drawer may disclaim this liability by draw-
ing without recourse.
20. Liability to the drawer is based on ARK. STAT. ANN4. § 85-4-401 and (sometimes) on
an express contract that the bank will honor properly payable checks. This could appear on
a "signature card" the drawer signs when opening an account.
21. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-4 402 (1961).
22. See infra text between notes 80 and 85.
23. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-104(2)(b) (1961).
24. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-717 to -725 (Supp. 1981).
25. The description here is intentionally kept as simple as possible. Usually a bill of
1982]
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situation B, not A, will be the drawer and will draw the draft on A
who will then be the drawee. B will probably also take the draft to
his bank which might send it directly to A for payment. A should
then pay it, that is transfer $1,000 to B's bank. A, however, may not
pay the draft; instead he may dishonor it. Several things could go
wrong with the sale. The goods, for instance, may be worthless so
that A does not owe the money, or A may just decide to break his
contract. Since this action by A is possible, a draft, unlike a check,
is not a representation that B (the drawer) has deposited money with
A which should be paid. When A claims he owes B no money, and
dishonors the draft, B's bank does not have B arrested for writing a
"hot draft," even if B has withdrawn part of the amount.
A company may wish to use a draft on which it is both the
drawer and the drawee. This was the situation in the Canal case.
This is accomplished with a "payable through" draft-meaning it is
payable through a bank named on the face of the draft. Suppose A,
in Little Rock, makes such a draft payable to B, who then deposits it
in B's bank in Forth Smith. If the draft is "payable through" A's
bank, B's bank in Fort Smith will not send it directly to A but will
probably send it to the same place it would send A's check.26 How-
ever, what happens in this case is different.27 When the check is
used, since A has signed it, his bank takes the money out of his
deposit account. When the draft is used, however, since it is drawn
on A, not the bank, the instrument confers no authority for money
to be taken out of any account in the bank. Instead, the bank is
rendering A a different service. It will probably call him on the tele-
phone and tell him the draft has arrived. He will then come to the
bank and give the bank cash or write a check to cover the draft.
Thus it is said that A's bank "pays" the check but "collects" the
draft. A "pays" the draft. (This description of the process is delib-
erately kept simple to compare the two instruments. When busi-
lading will be used also. For an excellent description of the so-called "documentary sale"
using both instruments, see Farnsworth, Documentary Drafts Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 22 Bus. LAW. 479, 480-89 (1967).
26. This assumes that one of two things is true. First, B's Fort Smith bank may have a
correspondent bank in Little Rock, to which it will send all drafts and checks for collection.
Second, A may make his drafts "payable through" the same bank at which he maintains his
checking account (or all accounts if he has more than one). For a case involving a sale of
goods and showing the route of a "payable through" draft see Berman v. United States Nat'l
Bank, 197 Neb. 268, 249 N.W.2d 187 (1976).
27. For further reading on the "payable through" draft, see Murray, Drafts 'Payable
Through' Banks, 77 COMM. L.J. 389 (1972); Katskee, The Perils and Pitfalls of 'Payable
Through' Drafts 94 BANKING L.J. 333 (1977).
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nesses issue large masses of drafts, the banks will have more
sophisticated methods of handling the drafts, communicating with
the drawee, and arranging for payment. In some instances, perhaps,
money may have been advanced by the bank which the draft is
"payable through, ' 2 but basically the collection of the two types of
instruments is such that the check is always "payable by" a bank
while the draft is [sometimes] "payable through" a bank. Despite a
suggestion that the rule should be otherwise, 29 the latter is not paya-
ble by the bank.a°)
C. Acceptance and CertFcation
If A has money available to pay the draft, B may use a "sight"
draft. The draft may have the words "At sight pay to the order of-
" It could omit "At sight" and simply order "Pay to the
order of " as a check does. The word "Pay" with no
time stated means "Pay now" or "On demand pay." Suppose A,
however, does not have the $1,000 but wishes to borrow the money.
One method open to A is to use what is called the "Time Bill of
Exchange" or the "Time Draft."'a  B will take a blank draft and
date it the day he draws it, say September 29, 1982, as he would a
sight draft. Then, instead of writing "At sight" in the blank before
the word "Pay" he will insert the time that A needs the credit ex-
tended. It could begin "Ninety days after date pay . . . ." This
instrument then goes through the bank collection process until it
reaches A, but this time A does not pay it. Instead he "accepts" it
(and thereby makes a contract which can serve as a basis for ex-
tending him credit for ninety days). This means that he writes
across the instrument a promise to pay it when due (in ninety
days).32 This promise may be manifested by just his signature,33 or
it may consist of the words "Accepted, payable at X Bank by A."934
28. Murray, supra note 27, at 389.
29. F. BEUTEL & M. SCHROEDER, BANK OFFICER'S HANDBOOK OF COMMERCIAL LAW,
379 (5th ed. 1982).
30. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-120 (1961). For a case seeming to hold otherwise, but
arguing that the instrument involved was not a payable through draft, though it was sup-
posed to have been one, see Bermon v. United States Nat'l Bank, 197 Neb. 268, 249 N.W.2d
187 (1976).
31. B. CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT CARDS,
1.1[1] (1981); G. MUNN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE, 282 (F. Garcia, 7th ed.
1973).
32. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-410(1) (1961). And note the statement in Comment 4 to
this section to the effect that it may even be on the back of the instrument.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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This is an "acceptance" as defined by Uniform Commercial Code
section 3-410.35 This meaning is consistent with that contained in
section 3-413 which sets out the contract of an acceptor. 36 It is this
and only this that is meant by section 3-409 which provides that a
"drawee is not liable on the instrument until he accepts it." 37 After
such an acceptance the drawee is liable on the instrument by virtue
of a written promise to pay. This meaning of "accept", however, is
not the same as a mere decision to pay even if one employee of the
drawee agrees verbally with another employee that the draft should
be paid. There must be a writing. This fits in with the requirement
of section 3-401(1) that "no person is liable on an instrument unless
his signature appears thereon."
When a bank "accepts" a check this is known as "certifica-
tion." Acceptance of a time draft and certification of a check,
however, serve different purposes. Since the time draft, above,
would not be due for ninety days, A did not have to pay it when it
was presented to him. He did have to put on the draft his written
promise to pay and return it to B, because refusal to accept a time
draft when presented is a "dishonor. ' 39 After acceptance, if B
wanted money immediately he would try to sell the instrument
(probably to a bank which would later collect the money from A
when the instrument was due).' First, however, A must have ac-
cepted the draft so that A would be liable on the instrument. This
transaction would be similar to selling a promissory note signed by
A.4 If B were willing to be the lender, he would keep the draft and
collect it when due.
35. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-410 (1961):
(1) Acceptance is the drawee's signed engagement to honor the draft as
presented. It must be written on the draft, and may consist of his signature
alone. It becomes operative when completed by delivery or notification.
36. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-413 (1961):
(1) The maker or acceptor engages that he will pay the instrument according to
its tenor at the time of his engagement or as completed pursuant to Section 3-
115 on incomplete instruments.
37. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-409 (1961):
(1) A check or other draft does not of itself operate as an assignment of any funds
in the hands of the drawee available for its payment, and the drawee is not
liable on the instrument until he accepts it.
38. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-411(1) (1961).
39. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 85-3-507(1)(a), 85-3-501(l)(a) (1961).
40. B. CLARK, supra note 31, 7.4[1); A. FARNSWORTH, CASES ON COMMERCIAL PA-
PER, 388-89 (2d ed., 1976).
41. Note that the contract (or engagement) of the maker of a promissory note is the
same as that of the acceptor of a draft, under § 85-3-413(1), supra note 36.
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ACCEPTANCE AND DISHONOR
Since all checks are demand instruments, however, they are due
to be paid immediately. And the debtors, as drawers, are liable on
them. If the drawee bank is requested to certify a check, the bank
can refuse, because refusal to certify is not a dishonor (unless the
bank has agreed otherwise).42 If the person who is refused is the
payee (or his representative-the bank presenting the check), he is
no worse off. Unlike the creditor (or the creditor's representative-
the presenting bank) using the time draft, he can demand to be paid
now and thus does not need the written promise to pay (the accept-
ance). The bank may choose to certify the check, however, and
would more likely do so for its customer, the drawer, than for a
holder. A drawer will want it certified to make it more readily ac-
ceptable. Although the drawer is liable since he signed the instru-
ment, if it is certified the one to be paid is assured that the bank's
worth is behind the check.43 An uncertified check might be drawn
against funds that will not be there (because the drawer has with-
drawn them previously) by the time that collection is attempted.
The certified check, however, contains a written promise of the
drawee bank to pay, written across the face (that is binding even if
the drawer [through the bank's error] withdraws his own funds). A
similar promise is found in the signature of the drawee as drawer on
a cashier's check and on a bank money order.' These three instru-
ments-the certified check, cashier's check and bank money order-
are used in similar situations in which third parties are leery of ordi-
nary checks.
At this point recall that (a) the draft in the Canal Insurance
Company case was a sight draft, (b) the drawer and the drawee were
the same party, and (c) nothing was said about using the draft in the
way a certified check would be used-to pay a third party. A time
draft is useful in the sale of goods to a buyer who needs time and
credit to pay for the purchase. It is not needed where an insurance
company has the money to pay its claims. Nor will an insurance
draft be drawn by the claimant (whose situation is similar to that of
the seller B, above, who signed the draft). It will be drawn by an
adjuster or agent who is acting for the company (whose situation is
similar to that of A, above, who signed the check). The company
could just as well use a check.45 Nor will it be sent back by the
42. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-411(2) (1961).
43. H. BAILEY, BRADY ON BANK CHECKS, § 10.7 (5th ed. 1979).
44. Id. at §§ 1.11, 1.13, and 1.16.
45. For some of the reasons that drafts are used instead 'of checks see Murray, supra
1982]
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drawee to be circulated like a certified check.
D. Remitters and the Sale of Credit
When an ordinary check is used by abank's customer, the cus-
tomer signs the check as its "drawer." The bank owes the customer
a debt by virtue of the customer's deposits, and as a drawer he or-
ders the bank to pay part of the debt to the holder4 6 of the instru-
ment. If a cashier's check 47 or bank money order48 is used, however,
a different relationship is involved. The purchaser is not the
drawer49 but rather is usually called the "remitter." 50 When the
holder presents one of these instruments for payment, the amount is
not to be subtracted from the purchaser's deposit account. Such an
instrument has been paid for by the purchaser at the time of issue,
and the amount of it now must be paid from the funds of the
drawee.
A common expression is that a depositor has "money in the
bank." Although this is not a true description of the relationship, it
may be of help here. If someone is comfortable with that expression
in regard to ordinary checking accounts, he will no doubt say that
holders are paid "depositors' money." If so, by analogy, holders of
cashier's checks and bank money orders are paid "the bank's
money."
A remitter purchases the credit of the drawee. A customer who
is a drawer has a right to instruct a bank what to do with his credit
(or his "money in the bank"). So after a customer draws an ordi-
nary check (ordering a bank to pay) he has a right to stop payment
(and thereby countermand or cancel the order).5' The bank obeys
note 27, at 389. As of this writing a change has occurred in the number of banks paying
interest on deposits as compared with the time Professor Murray's article was written.
46. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-1-201(20) (Supp. 1981) defines "holder" as follows:
(20) "Holder" means a person who is in possession of a document of title or an
instrument or an investment security drawn, issued or indorsed to him or to
his order or to bearer or in blank.
As used in the above sentence the holder is often a bank because the person to whom the
instrument was issued indorses the instrument and deposits it in a bank.
47. H. BAILEY, supra note 43, at § 1.11; F. BEUTEL & M. SCHROEDER, supra note 29, at
§ 25-15; B. CLARK, supra note 31, at 1.1[1]; G. MuNN, supra note 31, at 173.
48. H. BAILEY, supra note 43, at § 1.16; F. BEUTEL & M. SCHROEDER supra note 29, at
§ 25-20; B. CLARK, supra note 31, at I 2.6(3][d1[i].
49. H. BAILEY, supra note 43, at § 1.11 (cashier's check) and at § 20.15 (bank money
orders).
50. F. BEUTEL & M. SCHROEDER, supra note 29, at § 25-70. The term is not defined in
the Uniform Commercial Code.
51. Fox, Stopping Payment on a Cashier's Check, 19 B.C.L. REV. 683, 684 (1978).
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because it is not free to do as it pleases with the customer's account
(his "money"). On the other hand a remitter purchases the credit of
the drawee; and since it is the bank's credit (the "bank's money")
which is involved, the customer (now a remitter, not a drawer) is not
free to do as he pleases with that. Thus, a remitter has no right to
stop payment on a cashier's check5 2 or a bank money order.53 The
bank is free to do as it pleases with its own credit (its "money").
Even though the remitter writes his name on a cashier's check
or bank money order, it is still only his name, not his signature. It is
put there for information purposes, to identify him. He may need to
use the information later to show that he bought it and transferred it
to pay a debt. It is not put there with an intention to authenticate
the writing. Thus, a remitter has not signed and is not liable on the
instrument,54 but he may be liable under warranty theory.55
It should be pointed out, also, that even though a drawee is
directly liable on an instrument, it does not always follow that the
person to whom it is payable is being transferred credit which has
been sold to a remitter by the drawee. A bank selling cashier's
checks and bank money orders (on which it is directly liable) can be
cheated out of its credit when selling to a remitter, and the cheater
can sell the credit to innocent payees who will then be able to collect
on it.56 Since they did not deal directly with the bank, they have
done nothing to give the bank a defense against paying. In the case
of insurance company drafts, however, as used in the Canal case
(and on which the drawee is directly liable), the payees and not re-
mitters have dealt directly with the drawer-drawee. Therefore, the
insurance company drawee has a defense against a payee who has
52. Id. at 685.
53. H. BAILEY, supra note 43, at § 20.15.
54. F. BEUTEL & M. SCHROEDER, supra note 29, at § 25-70.
55. Id. This is because ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-417(2) provides:
(2) Any person who transfers an instrument and receives consideration warrants
to his transferee and if the transfer is by indorsement to any subsequent
holder who takes the instrument in good faith that
(a) he has a good title to the instrument or is authorized to obtain payment
or acceptance on behalf of one who has a good title and the transfer is
otherwise rightful; and
(b) all signatures are genuine or authorized; and
(c) the instrument has not been materially altered; and
(d) no defense of any party is good against him; and
(e) he has no knowledge of any insolvency proceeding instituted with re-
spect to the maker or acceptor or the drawer of an unaccepted
instrument.
56. Fox, supra note 51, at 686 (cashier's check); Thompson Poultry v. First National
Bank of York, 199 Neb. 8, 255 N.W.2d 856 (1977) (bank money order).
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cheated it into issuing the draft." In other words, it has a defense
against a payee with whom it deals directly and gets nothing in re-
turn. In most jurisdictions the same would be true on a cashier's
check58 or bank money order,59 if the dishonest purchaser made
himself the payee.60
E. Stopping Payment
The Uniform Commercial Code expressly gives to the drawer
of a check the right to order his bank to stop payment on that
check.6 A New York court has said, "Nowhere in the Negotiable
Instruments Law is there any provision that a drawee may 'Stop
Payment' of a check unless ordered to do so by the drawer."62 This
statement is misleading and can lead to the conclusion that a bank
lacks the power which it in fact has. The reason for the absence of a
provision needs explaining, since there is no provision in the Code
either.
The process by which a drawer acts to prevent a check from
being paid is referred to in the Uniform Commercial Code as "stop-
ping payment" or "issuing a stop order." Courts sometimes refer to
it as "countermanding" (the order to pay, which the check is). The
Code gives the power only to the drawer;63 if the payee, for instance,
issues a stop payment order, the drawee may ignore it.64 But it
should be kept in mind that it is an order given to a drawee bank.65
Thus, the Code cannot be expected to contain a provision that a
bank may "stop payment" on its customer's checks, because if it did
so it would be providing for the bank to order itself to do something
57. Travelers Insurance Co. v. Godsey, 260 Md. 669, 273 A.2d 431 (1971).
58. Mid Central Towing Co. v. National Bank of Tulsa, 348 P.2d 327 (Okla., 1959);
Travi Const. v. First Bristol County Nat'l Bank, 10 Mass. App. 32, 405 N.E.2d 666 (1980);
For cases on both sides see Fox, supra note 51, 686-690.
59. State Bank of Brooten v. American Nat'l Bank, 266 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. 1978).
60. This will occur if the purchaser at the time of issue does not know the name of the
pers6n to whom the funds are to be transmitted, does not wish to leave the payee's name
blank, and knows enough about commercial paper to know that this is a solution to the
problem.
61. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-4-403(1) (1961). This section does not use the word
"drawer," but this is clearly the meaning of "A customer may ... stop payment of any item
payable for his account .... " [emphasis supplied].
62. Rose Check Cash. Serv. v. Chemical Bank N. Y. Tr. Co., 40 Misc.2d 995, 244
N.Y.S.2d 474, 477 (1963).
63. See supra note 61.
64. This is also pointed out in Comment 3 to ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-4-403 (1961).
65. See supra note 61. The subsection begins: "A customer may by order to his bank
stop payment .... " [emphasis supplied].
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and in turn it would be providing that a bank must obey an order
from itself. Nor should anyone expect the Code to contain a provi-
sion that a bank could not "stop payment" on a drawer's check.
The Code does concern itself with the next step, however, that of the
bank's dishonoring the check (whether in reliance to the stop order
or not).
When the drawee obeys the order and the check is not paid, the
Code refers to this as a "dishonor. ' 66 It is this act (which affects
others than the bank) which the Code regulates. The reader may
then ask: What if the court had said, "Nowhere in the Code is there
a provision that a drawee may dishonor a check unless ordered to do
so by the drawer?" Whether such statement serves as a useful guide
for anything will be discussed later with "Dishonor. ' 67 It is well to
remember that the success of a search through the Code's provisions
depends upon accepting its language. Since the term "stopping pay-
ment" refers to a drawer's order, the sections governing the order
(e.g., when it is too late68 or if it must be in writing 69) refer to "stop-
ping payment" and not to "dishonor." Likewise, the sections gov-
erning the bank's response, the act of dishonor (e.g., what it is or is
not,70 and what must be done about it7 ') refer to "dishonor" and not
"stopping payment."
F. The Consequences of Stopping Payment
If an instrument is still in the hands of the person to whom it
was issued, the payee, and against whom the drawer has a defense,
stopping payment prevents a loss. Stopping payment to this payee
would avoid having to sue him for the money, as a drawer would
have to do if the instrument were paid. If the instrument is in the
hands of someone who bought it from that payee knowing he was
66. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-507(1) (1961).
67. Text with notes 91 through 103, infra.
68. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-4-303 (1961) provides as follows:
(1) Any knowledge, notice or stop-order received by, legal process served upon or
stop-order received by, legal process served upon or setoff exercised by a
payor bank, whether or not effective under other rules of law to terminate,
suspend or modify the bank's right or duty to pay an item or to charge its
customer's account for the item, comes too late to so terminate, suspend or
modify such right or duty if the knowledge, notice, stop-order or legal process
is received or served and a reasonable time for the bank to act thereon expires
or the setoff is exercised after the bank has done any of the following:
(a) accepted or certified the item.
69. Id. at § 85-4-403(2).
70. Id. at § 85-3-507(I) and (3).
71. Id. at §§ 85-3-508 and 85-3-511.
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not entitled to be paid, stopping payment would cause that person,
and not the drawer, to seek payment from the payee.72
If the person presenting an instrument for payment is a holder
in due course, the rules are different. A holder in due course is a
holder of a negotiable instrument who meets the additional require-
ments of having purchased the instrument for value and having
done so in good faith and without notice that there were any de-
fenses to its payment. 3 In each of the two Arkansas cases, these
requirements were met by the bank into which the instrument was
deposited and out of which the depositor drew its amount. 4
As to a holder in due course, stopping payment only delays
payment if the defense is what is known as a "personal" one. Issu-
ing an instrument either to the wrong person or to someone who
does not pay for it is a personal defense.75 The drawer must eventu-
ally pay a holder in due course on such an instrument. If the holder
in due course does not collect his money from the drawee when he
presents the instrument for payment, he collects from the drawer
later76 by means of a trial if necessary.
The drawer is also liable on the instrument to a holder who is
not a holder in due course (because he fails in one or more of the
requirements) if the drawer has no defense. Again, stopping pay-
ment only delays payment. The drawer may get some advantages
from stalling payment and forcing the other party to sue as plain-
tiff,77 and because of this may stop payment even when he knows he
owes the money. In addition, he is ordinarily liable for no more
than breach of contract because he did not pay after the drawee's
dishonor.7 A recent Missouri case indicated that a drawer could be
liable to the holder in tort as a consequence of stopping payment
72. Notice of the defense would keep the holder from being a holder in due course.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-302(l)(c) (1961). Not being a holder in due course, the holder
would take subject to the defense against the payee. Id. at § 85-3-306. Thus, he would
acquire no right to collect from the drawer.
73. Id. at § 85-3-302.
74. Purchasing for value occurs at the time of withdrawal. Id. at §§ 85-4-208(I)(a) and
85-4-209.
75. This follows from its not being included in any of the exceptions found in ARK.
STAT. AiNN. § 85-3-305(2), although it is a defense.
76. Id. at § 85-3-413(2).
77. Murray, The Stop Payment of Checks and the Holder in Due Course.: A Conflicts and
Comparative Law View, 8 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 225, 225-26 (1967).
78. See supra note 19. Also the section caption is "Contract of maker, drawer and ac-
ceptor" and another section provides that "Section captions are parts of this Act." ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 85-1-110 (Supp. 1981).
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under certain circumstances.79 However, there is nothing to indicate
that either defendant in the Arkansas cases would have been subject
to such liability.
G. Dishonor
When a check is duly presented to the drawee bank for pay-
ment and it is not paid, this is known as "dishonor." The same term
is used for nonpayment of a sight draft duly presented for payment
to a drawee. The term applies whether the nonpayment is following
the drawer's order to have payment stopped or on the drawee's own
initiative. When a time draft is duly presented to the drawee (A in
the example)for acceptance and the drawee does not accept it, this is
also a dishonor.8"
When an instrument is presented to the drawee for acceptance
or payment, the drawee is given a limited time in which to act. 8' He
must either pay it (or accept it if a time draft) or refuse to do so. If
he refuses to return a time draft or refuses to pay or return a check
or sight draft on demand,82 he is liable to pay the holder the amount
of the instrument.8 3 He will also have to pay this amount if he pays
the instrument, and it turns out that an indorsement was forged.84
He must pay the amount to the person whose indorsement was
forged. However, suits for either of these acts are brought in tort.
The action is for conversion, and the drawee is liable even though
he has not certified or accepted the instrument. Thus he will have to
pay the amount of an instrument even though his signature does not
appear on the instrument. These are not "exceptions" to the rule
requiring signatures, however, because the suit is not "on the instru-
ment." That would be a contract rather than a tort action, but the
amount of money recovered should be the same. Under the Negoti-
able Instruments Law, the refusal to return the checks or drafts
(conversion under the Uniform Commercial Code) was referred to
79. Porter v. Crawford & Co., 611 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. App. 1980).
80. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-507(1) (1961).
81. Where a letter of credit is not involved, if the instrument is a draft, and is to be paid,
the drawee must act before the close of business on the day of presentment. Id. at § 85-3-
506(2). If it is a draft presented for acceptance he has until the close of business on the day
following presentment. Id. at § 85-3-506(1). If the instrument is a check, the drawee bank
has until midnight of the day following presentment. Id. at § 85-4-301(1). (There is a condi-
tion that settlement be made before midnight of the day of receipt unless it is the depositary
bank, but the settlement may be revoked. Id. at § 85-4-301 and Comments 2 and 3 thereto).
82. Id. at § 85-3-419(I)(a) and (b).
83. Id. at § 85-3-419(2).
84. Id. at § 85-3-419(I)(c) and (2).
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as "constructive acceptance." 5 Some courts used the same term for
payment over a forged indorsement s6 The Arkansas court in 1911,
however, refused to do so. 8  There seemed to be a determination on
the part of those who did so to adhere to the rule that no drawee
could be liable to a holder unless the drawee "accepted" the instru-
ment. The Code, however, rejected the concept.88
If the drawee decides to dishonor the instrument, it must notify
the party who presented it within a certain time and in a certain
manner, or be "accountable for the amount" of it due to a Code
imposed liability.8 9
H. The Consequences of Dishonor
What are the consequences to a drawee of honoring a drawer's
stop payment order? If a personal check is the instrument and the
bank dishonors the check, the bank avoids being involved in any
suit brought by the holder against the drawer.90 The holder brings a
claim against the drawer and either wins because the money is owed
or loses because it is not owed. But the bank stands aside (meaning
it is not a proper party defendant in the lawsuit). The dishonor was
correct because it followed the customer's order. Whether the stop
order was justified is not the bank's concern.
What if the drawer does not issue a stop order, but the drawee
bank dishonors the instrument anyway? In some instances its action
is not only allowed but desirable because a drawee owes a duty to
pay only properly payable instruments.9 Thus, if a check is written
for more than the drawer has on deposit, and no provision has been
made for paying overdrafts, the bank may dishonor it.92 Further-
more, even if it is properly payable otherwise, the bank may dis-
85. Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law § 137; W. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 179
(2d ed. 1961).
86. Pickle v. People's Nat'l Bank, 88 Tenn. 381, 12 S.W. 919 (1890); Dawson v. National
Bank of Greenville, 196 N.C. 134, 144 S.E. 833 (1928); See W. BRITTON, supra note 85, at
419-20.
87. Sims v. American Nat'l Bank, 98 Ark. 1, 135 S.W. 356 (1911).
88. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-419, Comment 1 (1961).
89. Id. at § 85-4-302.
90. Note, Blocking Payment on a Certfed, Cashier's or Bank Check, 73 MICH. L. REV.
424 at n.7 (1974). This follows from the fact that the bank's signature does not appear on the
instrument and assumes that the bank has not waited beyond the time limit of its "midnight
deadline" referred to in note 81 supra, or been guilty of conversion as in note 82, supra.
91, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-4-401 (1961); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 657 (2d. ed. 1980).
92. But it does not have to dishonor it if it chooses to pay it. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-4-
401 (1961).
[Vol. 5:519
ACCEPTANCE AND DISHONOR
honor an ordinary check if it is over six months old.93 In these two
examples the bank is not liable to anybody for its actions. The
Code, therefore, does allow dishonor without an order by the
drawer.
To go a step further, suppose the check is presented by a holder
the day it is drawn and the account has adequate funds, but the
drawee without a request from the drawer dishonors it. In such a
case the bank is not liable to the holder.94 It has not accepted (or
certified) the instrument; its signature does not appear on it. It is
immaterial that the drawee may be liable to the drawer.9
Even a drawee who is liable on an instrument (because his sig-
nature appears on it) may dishonor it on his own initiative when he
has a defense of his own, good against the holder.9 6 His position is
similar to that of a drawer of a draft or the maker of a note, and he
can assert personal defenses against holders not in due course.
Thus, in the Canal case, if Marlar had presented the draft, and the
drawee had dishonored it, Marlar could not have won in a subse-
quent suit.
If a bank money order or a cashier's check purchased by a re-
mitter is involved, different rules apply and the rules are by no
means agreed upon today.97 There is little dispute, however, that
the bank may still avoid liability for the dishonor in some cases.
The bank, because of the nature of the instrument, has bound itself
to holders to makeproper payment. Thus, if it dishonors the instru-
ment, it may not stand aside. As a party liable on the instrument,
the bank will be subject to suit when the instrument is dishonored.
Nevertheless, there are situations in which the bank may refuse to
pay the instrument and not be liable to the person presenting the
instrument for payment. One obvious example is that involving
theft of the instrument. Suppose the payee claims that the instru-
ment has been stolen from him and his endorsement has been
forged; he notifies the drawee not to pay anyone who presents it for
payment. What should the drawee do when the instrument is
93. Id. at § 85-4-404.
94. See supra notes 4 and 20.
95. The holder is not a third party beneficiary of the contract between the drawee and
the drawer, unless there are very unusual facts establishing such a contract. Ballard v.
Home Nat'l Bank of Arkansas City, 91 Kan. 91, 136 P. 935 (1913). See W. BRITroN,supra
note 85, at 501.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 57-60.
97. Some cases allow the bank to dishonor cashier's checks when they have defenses of
their own and the checks are not in the hands of holders in due course. Others do not. See
Fox, supra note 51, at 686-90.
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presented for payment? If a drawee could never refuse to pay in-
struments of these types, it would have to pay the persons presenting
them, even in this case. Yet as pointed out above, if the drawee does
pay, it will be liable in conversion to the payee.98 Surely the Uni-
form Commercial Code does not intend for drawees to be subject to
such double liability. If it did, such instruments would disappear
from use. Therefore, the drawee may and should refuse to pay the
instrument. The person presenting it is not the holder.99 The instru-
ment is not "properly payable" as one belonging to the person
presenting it. I°°
There are, of course, times when a bank will be liable to a
holder for breach of contract for the dishonor of a cashier's check or
a bank money order. One example of this is when the instrument is
in the hands of a holder in due course and the bank has only a
personal defense to payment.' 0' In both of the Arkansas cases the
holders were holders in due course 0 2 and the defenses were per-
sonal defenses. 10 3
I. The Personal Money Order
The personal money order is a new instrument. It has been re-
ferred to as a maverick,"° but on its face it complies with the re-
quirements of a check. It is a writing which is an order, drawn on a
bank, and payable on demand. 10 5 It is often used by people who
cannot afford to maintain a checking account at a bank. The pur-
chaser pays the amount of the instrument to the drawee bank and
uses the money order for the same purpose others use a personal
98. See supra text at note 84.
99. J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 583 (2d ed. 1980).
100. Kosic v. Marine Midland Bank, 76 A.D.2d 89, 430 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1980) aft'd, 55
N.Y.2d 621, 446 N.Y.S.2d 264, 430 N.E.2d 1317 (1981); H. BAILEY, supra note 43, at
§ 23.3(23.5). A contrary rule would be absurd so long as ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-417(l)(a)
gives the drawee an action for breach of warranty of title so as to be able to recover money
paid a person holding after a forged indorsement. Must the drawee pay and then immedi-
ately ask for his money back? Strictly speaking, this is not a dishonor but a rightful refusal
to pay.
101. Thompson Poultry, Inc., v. First Nat'l Bank of York, 199 Neb. 8, 255 N.W.2d 856
(1977); Fox, supra note 51, at 687 (Cashier's check).
102. See supra note 74.
103. See supra note 75.
104. Note, Personal Money Orders and Teller's Checks: Mavericks Under the U. C. C, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 524 (1967).
105. Id. at 531. See, in general, H. BAILEY, supra note 43, at § 1.16; F. BEUTEL & M.
SCHROEDER, supra note 29, at § 25-29; B. CLARK, supra note 31, at I 2.6131[d]. And see the
analysis of Justice Dudley in the dissent to the Sequoyah case, 274 Ark. at 5, 621 S.W.2d at
685.
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check. The purchaser signs it and is the "drawer." 106 He may order
payment stopped and the drawee must honor the stop order in the
same way it must on an ordinary check. 1°7 The payment that is
made to the bank is, in effect, a deposit. The bank money order, on
the other hand, is also a new instrument, and is used for the same
purpose as a cashier's check. 0 8 A person who buys one is ordinarily
a "remitter.' ' ° A payee takes it with the understanding that pay-
ment will not be stopped if his debtor (the remitter) changes his
mind about a purchase or payment. He takes it assuming that since
the bank is liable on the instrument, the money order will not be
dishonored for insufficient funds.
There is a place for both types of money orders. People who
cannot afford to maintain checking accounts are able to occupy a
position similar to that of those with more money by being able to
stop payment on their personal money orders. There is room for
this "poor man's check," and cases from other states hold that the
drawee bank on such an instrument is no more liable than on a
personal check. 0 The Arkansas Supreme Court, however, has held
otherwise. This makes its utility questionable. People who need an
instrument on which a bank is liable can, in either jurisdiction, use a
bank money order.
J. Custom
The dissent in the Canal case referred to a custom, common to
the insurance industry, of not treating the instruments as negotiable
"until accepted.""' The majority in the Sequoyah case referred to a
"custom and practice of the business community to accept personal
money orders as a pledge of the issuing bank's credit.""112 In a fairly
recent case, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that evidence of the
custom was not admissible when there was no evidence that the op-
posing party had knowledge of it, and there was no connection be-
106. Thompson v. Lake County Nat'l Bank, 47 Ohio App. 2d 249, 353 N.E.2d 895
(1975). One authority refers to the purchaser as a "remitter," however. B. CLARK, supra
note 31, at 2.6[3][d][i].
107. See infra notes 141 & 154.
108. Bank of Niles v. American State Bank, 14 Ill. App. 3d 729, 303 N.E.2d 186 (1973);
Thompson Poultry, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 199 Neb. 8, 255 N.W.2d 856 (1977); Bank of El
Paso v. Powell, 550 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
109. He can have himself named as payee instead. In either case the bank is the drawer
by virtue of its officer's signature.
110. See infra notes 141 & 154.
111. 266 Ark. at 1054, 596 S.W.2d at 715.
112. 274 Ark. at 3, 621 S.W.2d at 683.
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tween that party and other transactions (which should have made
him aware of the custom and usage)." 3 More particularly, the court
in an earlier case had held that evidence of a custom in New York
City was inadmissible in the absence of a showing that the defend-
ant in Arkansas had knowledge or notice of such custom." 4
The use of custom in legal disputes has been well discussed
elsewhere." ' 5 Any attempt to go into the matter in depth here would
distract from the attention that is intended to be paid to "accept-
ance," so it will not be done. A more thorough analysis of the
court's use of custom in the Sequoyah case or the use to which it
might have been put in the Canal case could be the subject of an-
other study. However, a brief mention of the matter is included
here because the Arkansas Supreme Court used custom to adopt a
rule that found an "acceptance" in the Sequoyah case.
IV. USING THE BACKGROUND
A. Acceptance and the Draft Case
Using the background material above, consider now the two
cases. In the Canal case the insurance company argued that the
draft was not negotiable because payment was conditioned "Upon
acceptance," that it had "no affirmative obligation under the instru-
ment" until it had accepted the draft, and that until acceptance the
company could "stop payment."'" 6 It then referred to the Code def-
inition of acceptance in Section 3-410(1).' 7 The court in reply cited
an earlier Arkansas case" 8 and a Pennsylvania case" 9 to the effect
that the very act of drawing the draft upon itself as drawee was ac-
ceptance of the draft. Other cases referring to a similar use of the
words "Upon acceptance" have made similar arguments. 2 °
It is submitted that the company's argument, the court's reply,
113. Venturi, Inc. v. Adkisson, 261 Ark. 855, 552 S.W.2d 643 (1977).
114. Ben F. Levis, Inc. v. Collins, 215 Ark. 172, 219 S.W.2d 762 (1949).
115. Note, Custom and Trade Usage: Its Application to Commercial Dealings and the
Common Law, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1192 (1955); Levie, Trade Usage and Custom Under the
Common Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101 (1965).
116. 266 Ark. at 1048, 596 S.W.2d at 712.
117. Id.
118. First Nat'l Bank of Huttig v. Rhode Island Ins. Co., 184 Ark. 812, 43 S.W.2d 535
(1931).
119. Falk's Food Basket v. Selected Risks Ins. Co., 214 Pa. Super. 522, 257 A.2d 359
(1969).
120. Frickleton v. Fulton, 626 S.W.2d 402, 408 (Mo. App. 1981); Lialios v. Home Ins.
Companies, 87 Ill. App. 3d 740, 43 IU. Dec. 193, 410 N.E.2d 193, 194 (1980); Comet Check
Cashing Serv., Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Group, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 852 (1968).
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and the cited cases misconstrued the meaning of the word "accept-
ance." As pointed out above, acceptance, in the sense of the written
obligation on the front of an instrument, is used on time drafts' 2' or
on instruments where the drawee's credit is needed (as certified
checks). 122 The draft in Canal and the other cases was a sight draft.
It was not meant to be sent back to Marlar to be used as a certified
check would be. It was not designed therefore to be accepted upon
presentation, but rather to be paid. What could be more absurd
than adding on the front of an instrument a written promise to pay
it immediately and then paying it immediately? It is a waste of time
and ink. What holder, having been sent his money, would ever
know that the acceptance had been put on the instrument just before
it was filed away?
Remember also that in the sale of goods example one party
drew the draft on another party and the other later accepted it.
123
This added the liability of the other, and up until that was done the
other was not liable. But Canal, contrary to its argument, was liable
on the draft (as the drawer surely, under even Canal's meaning of
"acceptance") from the minute that it drew the draft. Granted that
the liability of a drawer is ordinarily different from that of an ac-
ceptor, it was the same here since Canal was the drawee also. The
liability was the same as a bank's liability on a cashier's check. 124
Therefore no greater obligation would be assumed by Canal if it
later accepted the draft by writing an acceptance on the face. Such
an action would be as useless as certifying a cashier's check.
Thus, the word had no reference to the contract defined in sec-
tion 85-3-410 and referred to in sections 85-3-413 and 85-3-409. The
courts worked to find such an acceptance needlessly.
What, then, did the phrase mean? It must have meant, "Unless
notified that this draft has not been drawn for a proper claim, pay
. ... " In other words "acceptance" must have been used as a lay-
man would understand it, not as a technical word of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Why are the words there? Probably because in
the offices of many companies at the location where drafts are paid,
two employees will be involved in the payment procedures. One
will have a job in the nature of claims supervision. The other will
be in the department which pays the drafts; call it the "paying de-
121. See supra text accompanying notes 31-41.
122. See upra text accompanying notes 42-44.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
124. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 85-3-118(a) (Supp. 1981) and 85-3-413(1) (1961). This is simi-
lar to the result referred to in note 41, supra.
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partment." Between the time the draft is drawn and it is presented,
something may be discovered to be wrong. The person in claims
supervision will then be notified by the company's employee or an
independent adjuster who drew the draft. He will in turn notify the
person in the "paying department" to dishonor the draft when the
bank presents it for collection. The words amount to a courteous
warning or reminder to the person in the "paying department" to be
sure that payment of the draft is proper before he authorizes pay-
ment, or at least to follow the orders of the claims supervision
department.
Looking at the words in this light, we still see that they are
superfluous, no more than a formality. Surely the employee already
knows not to pay drafts when something wrong is discovered, and
he acts the way he does not because of the words on the draft but
because of his duty. Take the words off the draft and his conduct
should not change a bit. With or without the words (and with or
without notice from a fellow employee), drawees (and their employ-
ees) are not supposed to pay drafts or checks not properly payable.
Thus, the words do not make the payment conditional. The final
result in the case was correct.' 25
Perhaps the court worded the statement the way it did because
Canal had argued that "until acceptance, Canal had every right to
stop payment on the draft."' 126 The answer is that, while the state-
ment may be true if one views Canal solely as the drawer, neverthe-
less since there was no real defense to the instrument (as where an
indorsement is forged), the holder in due course had a rightful claim
to payment. 127
125. These observations are based on experiences of the author, who was at one time an
employee of the claims department of a major insurance company. For a discussion of pre-
code law on the negotiability of "upon acceptance pay" instruments, see W. BRITTON, supra
note 85 at 33-34 & n.8 which indicates that a statement which merely states a condition of
fact or law necessarily present should not destroy negotiability. For an argument that the
word "acceptance" is used in the layman's sense but refers to thepayee's acceptance of the
draft as settlement of its claim against the insurance company, see Standard Fed. Sav. &
Loan v. Citizens Ins. Co., 99 Mich. App. 338, 297 N.W.2d 656 (1980).
126. Supra note 116.
127. Canal also argued that "Payable Through... [a South Carolina bank]" destroyed
negotiability, but its reasoning was not fully set out in the opinion. It argued that the bank
was not a drawee and could not pay. But the case does not indicate that the bank had paid
or was being sued for failure to pay. Clearly it was Canal who had the duty to pay, either as
drawer, or as drawee of a draft drawn on itself. Now, if Canal meant that the words "paya-
ble through . . ." made payment conditional because it would not be paid if not sent
through that bank, this would not be true either. Those words are put on for the benefit of
collecting banks to tell them how to route the drafts. If the holder of such a draft walks up
to the front door of the insurance company's office and presents the draft directly to the
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B. Acceptance and the Personal Money Order Case
In the Sequoyah case, the issue, according to the opinion, was
whether or not Union Bank, the seller of the personal money order,
could "stop payment" on the personal money order on its own initi-
ative.' 28 The Arkansas Supreme Court held that it could not. In
Mirabile v. Udoh,129 the Small Claims Part of the Civil Court of
New York, Kings County, had ruled that a bank which had sold a
personal money order and had dishonored it, following a stop pay-
ment order by the drawer, nevertheless had to pay the holder. It
reasoned that there is a "common belief and usage among
merchants that the party entitled to sign and deliver a money order
issued by a bank is authorized to bind that bank's credit."' 3° The
Arkansas court said that it could consider "this custom and practice
in construing the legal effect of such instruments." 13' The dissent, as
stated above, pointed out that there was not one single word in the
transcript or abstract about business custom, and that it had not
been proven. 1
32
The Arkansas court also cited and followed the Mirabile case to
hold that the "issuance of the money order with the bank's printed
name evidences [Union's] intent to be bound thereby."'' 33 It later
replied to an argument that the instrument had not been accepted,
"In our opinion, however, the appellee accepted the instrument in
advance by the act of its issuance." ' 31 The dissent pointed out that
the statement was not supported by authority and "create[d] an un-
necessary legal quagmire."' 135
Before examining the argument that the instrument was ac-
cepted, consider as an aside the reception of the "custom" as a justi-
fication for doing so. It is submitted that the dissent's protestations
were justified. Three points may be made.
First, as pointed out above, custom is a matter of fact to be
proved. 36 Did the majority of the Arkansas court conclude it had
drawee, completely ignoring the bank that it is "payable through," he is entitled to be paid.
Since this instrument may be treated as a note, presentation may be made directly to the
drawee.
128. 274 Ark. at 2, 621 S.W.2d at 683.
129. 92 Misc. 2d 168, 399 N.Y.S.2d 869 (1977).
130. Id.
131. 274 Ark. at 3, 621 S.W.2d at 683.
132. 274 Ark. at 7, 621 S.W.2d at 685-86.
133. 274 Ark. at 4, 621 S.W.2d at 684.
134. Id.
135. 274 Ark. at 6, 621 S.W.2d at 685.
136. Venturi, Inc. v. Adkisson, 261 Ark. 855, 552 S.w.2d 643 (1977).
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been proved in Airabile and therefore did not need to be proved
again? Was there in fact such a custom? The plaintiff, Vincent
Mirabile d/b/a Ridge Auto Collision, represented himself accord-
ing to the report of the case.' 37 The trial judge referred to no evi-
dence which proved a custom. It is rather difficult to expect that a
garage mechanic in small claims court presented numerous wit-
nesses to testify to business custom. It is questionable that there is
such a custom. Consider the statement of the trial court in Garden
Check Cashing Service, Inc. v. First National City Bank 138 (the ap-
pellate decision of which is the controlling authority in New York)
which said, "[Pilaintiff's contention that a business man would ac-
cept and assume that such check as at bar would be the equivalent
of a cashier's check is untenable."' 139 Did the New York Court of
Appeals not accept this in affirming the case? Nowhere is it refuted
in the appellate opinions.
Second, even if the Mirabile case is evidence of a custom in
New York, the Arkansas Court had previously held that such a cus-
tom cannot bind an Arkansan (Union) without any showing that the
Arkansan had knowledge of it.' 40 No such knowledge by Union
was shown.
Third, even if it was a custom in New York and even if Union
knew of its existence in New York, that is not evidence that it was a
custom in Arkansas (where the money order was issued) or in
Oklahoma (where the Sequoyah bank was located).
There was no mention in the Canal case, in either the majority
opinion or the dissent, concerning evidence of the custom or lack of
it. Because of the result of the case, however, it was not affected by
the custom argument.
Now, to return to the matter of acceptance, it will be well to see
how other states have viewed the acceptance or liability of drawees
on personal money orders. Beginning in 1963, three cases arose out
of which New York developed its law concerning personal money
orders. The first case was Garden Check Cashing Service, Inc. v.
First National City Bank.' 4' The purchaser lost a "Register Check-
137. 92 Misc. 2d at 168, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
138. 38 Misc. 2d 623, 238 N.Y.S.2d 751 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1963).
139. 38 Misc. 2d at 626, 238 N.Y.S.2d at 754.
140. See, e.g., Venturi, Inc. v. Adkisson, 261 Ark. 855, 552 S.W.2d 643 (1977); Ben F.
Levis, Inc. v. Collins, 215 Ark. 172, 219 S.W.2d 762 (1949).
141. 25 A.D.2d 137, 267 N.Y.S.2d 698 (1966), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 941, 223 N.E.2d 566, 277
N.Y.S.2d 141 (1966). This case was tried in 1963 before either Rose, 43 Misc. 2d 679, 252
N.Y.2d 100 (1964), or Garden-Chase Manhattan, 46 Misc. 2d 163, 258 N.Y.S.2d 918 (N.Y.
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Personal Money Order," before signing it as the drawer, and
stopped payment on it. The second case was Rose Check Cashing
Service, Inc. v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. 142 In this case,
as in Sequoyah, the purchaser bought the money order with a check
drawn on insufficient funds. Since the bank discovered this before
the money order was presented for payment, it dishonored it. There
was no stop payment order. The third case was Garden Check Cash-
ing Service, Inc., v. Chase Manhattan Bank. 43 This case involved
two personal money orders which, as in the first case, were lost. The
case does not say whether or not the purchasers had yet signed the
instruments as drawers. The purchasers stopped payment on them.
In all three cases the holders sued the drawee banks claiming the
instruments were subject to the same rules as cashier's checks.
In the first case the drawee bank won at the trial level. '44 In the
next two the drawees lost at the trial level. 45 The first case was
reversed on the first appeal. 46 The second had already been af-
firmed by the same three judges who decided the appeal of the first
one.' 47 There is no appellate decision for the third. After three
years, the first case had reached the Supreme Court of New York,
Appellate Division, which granted leave to appeal because of the
diverse results in the three cases. That court decided in favor of the
drawee bank and set down its law as to the nature of this new instru-
ment to determine the propriety of stopping payment. 48
The court specifically stated that no officer of the drawee signed
the instrument, and that "[a]ny attempt to analogize the instrument
here with a cashier's. . . check fails."' 149 It further said, "Defendant
was not primarily liable thereon. . . and such liability did not arise
until there was certification or acceptance of the instrument."'' 50 It
further noted the difference between the personal money order and
the bank money order."'5 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed
City Civ. Ct. 1965). The trial court decision is found at 38 Misc. 2d 623, 238 N.Y.S.2d 751
(N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1963).
142. 43 Misc. 2d 679, 252 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Sup. Ct. App. Term, 1964).
143. 46 Misc. 2d 163, 258 N.Y.S.2d 918 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1965).
144. 274 Ark. at 6, 621 S.W.2d at 685.
145. For Rose, see 40 Misc. 2d 995, 244 N.Y.S.2d 474 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1964); for Garden-
Chase Manhattan, 38 Misc. 2d at 626, 238 N.Y.S.2d at 754.
146. 46 Misc.2d 721, 260 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. App. Term, 1965). The judges held that
the purchaser could not stop payment without submitting his carbon copy to the bank.
147. Supra, n.138. Both cases were decided in the First Department.
148. Supra, n.141.
149. 25 A.D.2d at 231, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
150. 25 A.D.2d at 232, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 702.
151. Id.
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this decision. 52 That decision governs the other two cases. Thus,
New York considers the personal money order to be like an ordi-
nary check and not an instrument on which the drawee is liable.
The drawee has to honor a drawer's stop payment order. In a trial
court decision in New York the seller of a personal money order
was held liable to the purchaser for failure to honor the purchaser's
stop order. 5
3
Subsequently, in New York and other states, purchasers of per-
sonal money orders were held to have the right to stop payment on
them. "'54 Appellate courts in those states held them to be like ordi-
nary checks. One stated, "The mere fact that the printed name of
the bank appeared on the face of the money order was not sufficient
to constitute its signature and therefore was not an acceptance of the
instrument for payment within the purview of [U.C.C. § 3-401
(1)].3'1
In 1972, in Krom v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. ,56 a
New York trial court again tried to treat a personal money order as
if it were one of which the drawee was liable and held that payment
could not be stopped "except for circumstances such as would apply
to certified checks." On appeal this was reversed, the court citing
the Garden-First National case.
Mirabile v. Udoh, 57 the 1977 trial case which the Arkansas
Supreme Court cited and followed, involved a personal money or-
der used to pay for towing and storing an automobile. The pur-
chaser drove off with the automobile and stopped payment on the
check. The bank complied with the order and dishonored the
money order. The holder sued the drawee bank and recovered; the
court used the reasoning mentioned in the Sequoyah case concern-
ing custom.l5 8 It also suggested that estoppel could have been the
basis of its decision' 59 but this does not appear in the Arkansas opin-
152. 18 N.Y.2d 941, 223 N.E.2d 566, 277 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1966).
153. McLaughlin v. Franklin Society Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 1183
(N.Y. Civ. Ct., 1969), involving a federal savings and loan association which was the seller
but not the drawee.
154. Berler v. Barclays Bank of New York, 82 A.D.2d 437, 442 N.Y.S. 2d 54 (1981);
Newman v. First Nat'l State Bank, 173 N.J. Super. 598, 414 A.2d 1367 (1980); Thompson v.
Lake County Nat'l Bank, 47 Ohio App. 2d 249, 353 N.E.2d 895 (1975). And in a criminal
case another court said drawers have this right. State v. LaRue, 5 Wash. App. 299, 487 P.2d
255 (1971).
155. Newman v. First Nat'l State Bank, 173 N.J. Super. at -, 414 A.2d at 1370.
156. 38 A.D.2d 871, 329 N.Y.S.2d 91 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
157. 92 Misc. 2d 168, 399 N.Y.S. 2d 869 (1977).
158. Id.
159. 92 Misc. 2d at 170, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 871.
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ion. There was no appeal from the Mirabile decision.
In 1981, a New York appellate court reaffirmed the Garden-
First National rule.' 6 ° The drawer had stopped payment on two
money orders even though she had no defense to payment (the same
situation as in Mirabile). The court ruled in favor of the drawee in a
suit by the holder. The opinion reaffirmed the rule that "a personal
money order sold by a bank to a purchaser is no different from a
personal check furnished by the bank for use by its checking ac-
count customers. The instruments are the same. Neither is an obli-
gation of the bank inasmuch as no signature of any bank official
appears anywhere thereon . . .. [T]he maker of the instrument
• . . has an absolute right to order the drawee (or issuing) bank to
stop payment."' 16 1
From the above cases it is evident that the Arkansas court is
alone as an appellate court in its reasoning that the personal money
order had been accepted. The signature of Union Bank did not ap-
pear on the personal money order. The name was not put on with
an intention to authenticate it. 162 The dissenting opinion was cor-
rect in saying there was no "express 'undertaking' to pay by the
bank." 63 It was also made a telling point in reminding the majority
that the "name of the drawee bank is on every ordinary check in
circulation."' 64 The problem with the instrument was that even if in
fact anyone was misled into believing that the drawee was directly
liable, the words which misled were not "Union National Bank" but
"Personal Money Order."' 165 Ordinary checks bear "Union Na-
tional Bank." They do not bear "Personal Money Order." Nobody
expects the bank to be liable on them.
To hold that the issuance of the personal money order "with
the bank's printed name" "evidenced" an intent to be bound and
that the bank "accepted the instrument in advance" creates
problems. To begin with, since there was no express undertaking,
no express intent to accept, what the court has come up with is a
"constructive acceptance"' ' 66 or "constructive certification." The
160. Berler v. Barclays Bank of New York, 82 A.D.2d 437, 442 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1981).
161. 82 A.D.2d at , 442 N.Y.S.2d at 55.
162. See supra note 3.
163. 274 Ark. at 5, 621 S.W.2d at 685.
164. 274 Ark. at 6, 621 S.W.2d at 685.
165. This would result from believing that all money orders are alike and that therefore
personal money orders are the same as bank money orders.
166. Compare the statement that the issuance "evidences the appellee's intent" with Uni-
form Negotiable Instruments Law § 137: "Where a drawee to whom a bill is delivered for
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term "certification" is preferred over "acceptance" since this is a de-
mand instrument drawn on a bank. Since it is a quasi contract (or
constructive contract) the intent of Union is immaterial, but the
Uniform Commercial Code has rejected the constructive acceptance
and envisions only express acceptance or certification.""
A comment to the Code section which adopted conversion-in
place of constructive acceptance points out that it did so to avoid
difficulties. The specific one mentioned results from the fact that an
instrument, by being accepted, is ipso facto not dishonored. Thus,
under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments law the holder - be-
cause of the "acceptance" - was without recourse against the
drawer and indorsers. 68 This recourse cannot be found by claiming
that the buyer can be held liable for breach of warranty the same as
a remitter (in this case for breach of the warranty that "no defense
of any party is good against him").' 69 The purchaser of a personal
money order does not "transfer" it when he "issues" it. Subsequent
people "transfer" his obligation. Surely the payee should have had
recourse against the drawer here. Had the drawer in this case been
in Oklahoma and been solvent, it would have been easier for the
bank to collect there than to have to come to Little Rock. We are
not told what the situation of the drawer was in Oklahoma in this
case, but surely there will be solvent local drawers in future cases
involving personal money orders. Nonpayment of a personal
money order is a dishonor and the drawer should be liable on the
instrument.
Another problem has to do with stopping payment. The Uni-
form Commercial Code provides that a stop order comes too late if
it is received after the bank has "accepted or certified the item."' 7 °
Surely "item" includes the money order,' 7 ' and arguably this rule
will apply to it. Thus, logically, drawers cannot stop payment on
acceptance destroys the same, or refuses . . . to return the bill . . . he will be deemed to
have accepted the same."
167. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-419, Comment 1 (1961).
168. Id.
169. See supra note 55.
170. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-4-303 (1961). And see the dissent in the Sequoyah case, 274
Ark. at 6, 621 S.W.2d at 685,
171. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-4-104. "Definitions and Index of Definitions
(1) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires ...
(g) "Item" means any instrument for the payment of money even though it is not
negotiable but does not include money."
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them. 72
Still another problem concerns the rights of one who holds
through a thief (or finder) of an unsigned personal money order
which has been signed by the thief (or finder). This was the fact
situation in Garden-First National.17 3 The thief (or finder) in one
criminal case, rather than signing his own name or making up a
fictitious one, forged the purchaser's name.'74 Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, the so-called rule of Price v. Neal'75 holds that if
a bank pays a holder in due course of a personal check bearing a
forged drawer's signature or pays a person who has in good faith
changed his position in reliance on the payment of such a check, it
cannot recover the money. 17 6 In the case of personal money orders,
the right to stop payment gives the money order purchaser some
protection against loss. If he discovers the loss of the instrument
and orders the drawee to stop payment before the holder in due
course presents it for payment, the holder in due course, not the
purchaser loses. However, if the rule of Price v. Neal applies to per-
sonal money orders, it is arguable that the bank will not be able
even to refuse to pay such holders in due course in Arkansas. Under
the rule, acceptance as well as payment is final.'77 Since acceptance
occurs at the time of issue it will be too late to try to avoid paying
those not rightfully entitled to the money. Will the bank then be
able to refuse to reimburse the purchasers who ordered payment
stopped? If so, people who use the "poor man's check" will need to
be re-educated on how to complete them.
Perhaps a bank should have to pay a personal money order
which has been issued for a hot check. This argument was made
elsewhere' 78 but the nature of the suit was not suggested. A better
basis of recovery would have been in tort. The Code suggests this is
a proper theory in certain cases. 17 9 A New York court suggested
172. And from the Mirabile case, supra, n.129, one must conclude either this or that
banks must pay twice.
173. Supra, n.141.
174. State v. LaRue, 5 Wash. App. 299, 487 P.2d 255 (1971).
175. 3 Burr. 1354 (1762).
176. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-418 (1961).
177. Id. This also conforms with § 85-4-303(1)(a), supra note 68.
178. See supra note 104, at 532.
179. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-409 (1961):
(2) Nothing in this section shall affect any liability in contract, tort or otherwise
arising from any letter of credit or other obligation or representation which is
not an acceptance.
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that it would hold a bank liable for failing to "observe the proper
caution in issuing money orders" in return for a hot check. °8 0 Such
a theory confines recovery to this fact situation and would not affect
the purchaser's right to stop payment. If a negligence (or any tort)
theory was used at the trial level of Sequoyah, it is not apparent
from the opinion. If it was, however, the verdict in favor of Union
indicates the judge found no negligence. The Supreme Court still
might have found negligence as a matter of law, and established
thereby a duty on the part of the bank to collect funds for payment
of the instrument. Surely, however, some evidence is necessary to
show that the instrument "represents" that it will be paid.
The negligence theory, in the future, could avoid what the dis-
sent in Sequoyah described as a "legal quagmire."18' It could be
used to regulate the creation and use of other methods of payment,
whether involving commercial paper or not. Recovery could also be
based on estoppel once it is established by proper evidence that the
business community has been led to believe that the instrument will
not be dishonored because of insufficient funds.
C. Both Cases and "Stopping Payment"
A New York court was quoted above as saying that the Uni-
form Negotiable Instruments Law did not provide that a drawee
could "stop payment" on a check unless ordered to do so by the
drawer.' 8 In the Sequoyah case, the Arkansas court also quoted
that case and in its concluding paragraph added that "[b]anks are
not allowed to stop payment on their depositor's checks . .. -83
In the Canal case the court said, "As maker and drawee of the in-
strument, Canal could not countermand the draft."' 84 From the
above material, it can be seen that these statements are misleading.
Since the countermand or the stop payment order is an order given
to the drawee, 8 5 the drawee (as the one giving and receiving the
order) may tell itself what it pleases and may obey orders from itself
as it pleases. We need to go further, however.
Since it was the dishonor of the instruments that caused the
drawee's problems to arise in these cases, the two statements to be
180. Emerick v. Long Island Trust Co., 20 U.C.C. Rep. 424 (Sup. Ct. App. Term, 1976).
181. 274 Ark. at 6, 621 S.W.2d at 685.
182. Rose Check Cash. Serv. v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Tr. Co., 40 Misc. 2d 995, 244
N.Y.S.2d 474 (1963).
183. 278 Ark. at 4, 621 S.W.2d at 684.
184. 266 Ark. at 1052, 596 S.w.2d at 714.
185. See supra note 65.
[Vol. 5:519
ACCEPTANCE AND DISHONOR
properly examined, need to be reworded to state the rule in that
light. As was pointed out above, the rules concerning stopping pay-
ment on and dishonor of cashier's checks are in dispute. 8 6 By anal-
ogy the same can be said of rules concerning bank money orders.
Yet some rules are clear. Taking the statement of the Court of Ap-
peals in the Canal case and substituting "dishonor" (or "refuse to
pay") for "countermand," the statement becomes: "As maker and
drawee of the instrument, Canal could not dishonor (or refuse to
pay) the draft." This, as a broad general statement, is incorrect as
shown above.18 7
The error may be further illustrated by considering the reason
in the Canal case for the argument against negotiability. Had the
First National Bank of Fort Smith not been a holder in due course,
the proper result of the case would have been that not only could
Canal dishonor, it should have. The bank would not have had an
enforceable claim to the money.'88 To return to an earlier illustra-
tion, even if the bank had fulfilled the other requirements of being a
holder in due course, it could not have won if the payee's indorse-
ment had been forged since it would not have been a holder.'89 This
is because the rule mentioned there applies to a bank money order
or cashier's check. Thus, the statement was so broad it was mislead-
ing. A narrow one would have been better.
Direct liability of the drawer alone did not forbid dishonor.
However, once the court determined that the instrument was nego-
tiable, the depository bank's position as a holder in due course
(which the court noted)' 9° allowed it to win, since the insurance
company's defense was only a personal one. 19' A correct statement
could have been made that was narrow enough to cover this. It
could have been, "Since a drawee must pay the holder in due course
of an instrument on which it is directly liable and on which there is
no real defense, it is liable in this case even though it dishonored the
draft."' 92
186. See supra note 97.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 95 and 100.
188. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-306(b) (1961). And the insurance company had a defense
good against Marlar. See supra text accompanying notes 95 and 97.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 98 and 100.
190. 266 Ark. at 1052, 596 S.W.2d at 714.
191. See supra note 75.
192. The knowledgeable ones may object that this does not take into account jus tertii
claims where e.g. a claimant has supplied indemnity under Ark. Stat. Ann. § 85-3-603
(1961). But it is not clear how the Arkansas court would rule on this in the case of an
instrument on which the drawee is directly liable to holders.
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Now consider the statement of the Arkansas Supreme Court in
the Sequoyah case. 193 Change that statement by substituting "dis-
honor" (or "refuse to pay") for "stop payment." Then acknowledge
that banks are required by the Uniform Commercial Code to dis-
honor checks when the drawer issues a stop order.' 94 The resulting
statement is: "Banks are not allowed to dishonor or refuse to pay
their depositor's checks in the absence of a stop payment order."
This may be what the court meant. Yet this statement is in error
too. To repeat, banks may dishonor or refuse to pay checks without
prior stop orders in the instances illustrated above. 95
A better statement would have taken into account two prior
conclusions of the court: (1) that Sequoyah Bank was a holder in
due course 196 and (2) that Union Bank was liable on the instrument
because it had accepted it. 197 That statement would have been al-
most the same as the one recommended for the Canal case: "Since a
drawee must pay the holder in due course of an instrument on
which it is directly liable and on which there is no real defense, it is
liable in this case even though it dishonored the personal money
order."
V. PREVENTING NEGOTIABILITY
If the insurance industry wants "payable through" drafts not to
be negotiable, the Code provides an easy way to accomplish this.
The last section of Article 3 provides that if the instrument is not
payable to order or to bearer, the Article still applies to it but there
can be no holder in due course of the instrument. 98 Had such an
instrument been involved in the Canal case, the bank would not
have had a right to recover. 199
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
As applied to the drawee of commercial paper, the rule that no
person is liable on an instrument unless his signature appears on it,
means that without an acceptance (or certification) the drawee is not
liable. As a consequence, unless there has been an acceptance or
193. See supra text accompanying n. 183.
194. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-4-403 (1961).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 91 and 95.
196. 274 Ark. at 2, 621 S.W.2d at 683.
197. 274 Ark. at 4, 621 S.W.2d at 684.
198. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-805 (1961).
199. Comet Check Cash. Serv., Inc. v. Hanoer Ins. Group, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 852 (1968).
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certification, the drawee is not liable to a holder for dishonoring the
instrument, even if the dishonor is wrongful. Some courts hold that
when the drawee is also the drawer, the signature as drawer is
equivalent to an acceptance at the time of issue of the instrument.
Thus, cashier's checks and bank money orders are considered as ac-
cepted or certified instruments.
Not everyone uses the word "acceptance" in the sense of the
Uniform Commercial Code. It may appear on an-instrument under
conditions indicating that it is used with the layman's meaning of
"approval" (although oral or even "tacit"). The Arkansas Court of
Appeals, in Canal Insurance Co. v. First Nat Bank of Fort Smith,200
interpreted the word as being used in its Code sense although the
circumstances indicated that it was being used in its layman's sense.
It reached the correct result in the case, however.
Regrettably, the Arkansas Supreme Court in Sequoyah State
Bank v. Union Nat'l Bank 2 1 found a drawee liable on a personal
money order even though the drawee's signature did not appear on
it. This was constructive acceptance, a concept the Uniform Com-
mercial Code has rejected. Although a drawee who does not sign it
cannot be liable on the instrument, he may be liable to a holder in
tort. However, since there was no finding of tortious conduct in this
case, the decision cannot be justified. It based its decision to employ
constructive acceptance on a so-called custom, but there was no evi-
dence of such a custom in the two jurisdictions where the personal
money order was used. The decision opened the door to potential
problems and hopefully will not serve as a guide to future cases.
Both cases contained misleading statements concerning stopping
payment. A good guide on this point is found elsewhere in the
statement that "it would be well for the courts to eschew the phrase-
ology of 'stopping payment' when considering the question of a
bank's right to decline to pay. '20 2
200. 266 Ark. 1044, 596 S.W.2d 710 (Ark. Ct. App. 1979); affyd 268 Ark. 356, 596 S.W.2d
709 (1980).
201. 274 Ark. 1, 621 S.W.2d 683 (1981).
202. Fox, supra note 51, at 697.
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